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IN THE SUPREME. COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BRIGHAM B. HARVEY and
RUTH l\I. HARVEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

No. 8631

HAIGHTS BENCH IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and App-ellant.

DEFENDANT.'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
This action was brought by the plaintiffs to enjoin
the defendant from placing water acquired from a new
or different source in their irrig.ation ditch across plain-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
tiffs' land, except during the period water had been
placed therein in the past from Farmington Canyon and
from maintaining a cement ditch on plaintiffs' land.
Plaintiffs also asked for general damages to their
land caused by reason of the improvements made by
defendant and for punitive damages (R. 1-4).
The Court denied plaintiffs' right to injunctive
relief (R. 218). The jury returned a verdict of $400.00
general damages and $400.00 punitive damages upon
which judgment was entered (R. 7-8).
The parties will be referred to as plaintiffs and
defendant as in the case below.
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs are the owners of approximately
35 acres of land in Davis County, State of lltah, located
2112 miles northeast of Farn1ington and about one-half
1nile from any paved lligh,Yay (R. ±±~ 7S). To reach
this p,roperty you n1ust cross over another piece of
property O\Yned by plaintiffs by a "'"agon trail or go
over a dirt road " . .hirh crosses the property of ~Ir. Phillips that lies to the \Vest (R. 73).
The property " . . as purcl1ased in 1938 for the sun1 of
$1,000.00. It has never been cultiYated or irrigated and
no crop~s have been raised thereon (R. 68). The defendant has 1naintained over and across the "'"est ru1d southwest portion of said land an irrigation ditcl1 (Exhibit
"A") through \Yhieh it has conyeyed \Y·ater to its stockholders for over forty years (R. 163, 186).
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In the Fall of 1955 defendant improved the northerly
portion of said ditch by cementing the ditch for a distance of 750 feet (R. 48). The cement ditch is 7 feet
wide at the top, 3 feet deep with sloping sides and has
a 14 inch flat bottom (R. 51) as shown by Exhibits "K"
and "I." The purp·ose of cementing this portion of the
ditch was to conserve water (R. 115) by stopping seepage and to prevent the flooding of Mr. Phillips' land
(R. 154).
The plaintiffs described the old ditch before the
same was cemented as being 6 to 8 feet wide, about 1¥2
to 2 feet deep with an average depth of one foot; that
water would flow in the ditch from the forepart of April
until the 4th of July and the flow would not exceed 15
feet. (R. 45).
The defendant's testimony showed that the old ditch
at the bottom was 6 to 8 feet wide and would run from
10 to 12 feet at the top. Where the gravel had been
cleared out and piled up on the west bank it would measure 25 or 30 feet to the east bank (R. 165, 167, 188). In
the later years dirt had been placed on the east hank
to the extent of 10 feet (R. 189).
The defendant was required to use the type of construction it did in cementing the ditch in order to obtain
financial .assistance from the Government. The plans
and specifications were recommended by the Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture of the
United States. They had been developed in conjunction
with other Federal Agencies and engineers and were in
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accordance with the national standard followed and
adopted by the Soil~C·onservation Service in Washington.
The entire project was designed and supervised by Glen
Austin, the engineer for the Soil Conservation Service.
Mr. Austin testified that they could not have put in any
other type or style of ditch and obtained part of the
expense from the Government, and that the ditch was
the most feasible, economical and efficient ditch for
that particular territory (R. 121, 122).
In the early days the ditch was cleaned by using
horses and a scraper, but since the advent of tractors
modern equipment has replaced the horses (R. 164).
Prior to the improvements one \Yas able to go along the
west bank with a wagon (R. 178, 188). In improving
the ditch a bulldozer '"·as used on the top of the pile
of sand that was on the "Test side so that soil could be
pushed hack into the ditch. This \Yas necessary to
straighten the ditch in its old original channel. In order
to improve the ditch it 'ras necessary to take out some
cottonwood trees growing do,vn to the \Yater~s edge and
scrub oak on the ditch banks (R. 1±3~ 16'7).
All of the 'vitnesses for the defendant, including
C. W. Lauritzen, who is connected \vith the Irrigation
Department of the College at Logan .and 'rho is also 'vith
the Agriculture Researeh Serviee of the lTnited States
Government, and Mr. Austin, the Engineer in charge,
testified that it was necessary to use as 1nuch land as
they had along both the west and e.ast banks in order
to bring in the equip1nent and do the \\~ork (R. 116, 128).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
The present ditch is much smaller than the old ditch.
The scarred area and where the road is now located was
originally a part of the old ditch hank (R. 167).
In relation to the damages and value of the p·roperty
Mr. Beesley, a real estate broker and land appraiser of
Bountiful called by plaintiffs, testified that the land
was worth $1,000.00 an acre. This valuation was based
upon the fact that in the future it might develop into a
housing project which is its ·highest potential use (R.
111). In his opinion the concrete ditch impaired its
value by 25 to 30 percent (R. 105) and the removal of
the o.ak brush would depreciate its value by about another
10 percent (R. 106).
Mr. E. J. Sharon, a realtor who makes property
valuation appraisals for the Veteran:S Administration,
banks and insurance companies, testified for the defendant that the land was worth about $100.00 an acre. In
his opinion the land was not suitable to be subdivided
for a housing project because of its location (R. 150)
and that even if the land were used for a housing project
the ditch, whether cemented or not, would not affect its
valuation (R. 151).
Prior to commencing the work Mrs. Harvey was
advised what defendant intended to do (R. 197). After
defendant had been working on the ditch for a week
Mr. Harvey went over to see what they were doing and
thereafter advised them that they could go ahead and
put in the ditch provided they would cover it. He made
no complaint about the road or the oak brush but only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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complained in relation to the type of the ditch (R. 47,
77).
There is no dispute as to the fact that the defendant
intends to use the ditch to convey the water contracted
for from the Weber Basin Conservatory District (R.
155) and that the water will be placed in a ditch after
the Farmington Canyon water is gone (R. 160).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT TO USE AS MUCH
LAND ON EACH SIDE OF THE DITCH AS WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN, REPAIR, IMPROVE
AND ENJ·OY ITS EASEMENTS.

II. THE QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
III.
JURY.

'THE

COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT TO USE AS MU·CH
LAND ON EACH SIDE OF THE DITCH AS "'"AS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN, REPAIR, IMPROVE
AND ENJOY ITS EASEMENTS.

Under this point ,,~e "~in also discuss the errors committed by giving Instructions Nos. 5 and 6 and failing
to give defendant's Requested Instruction X o. 5.
Under the decision of Bi!l Cottonzcood Ta;1ne 1· Ditch
Company v. lJfoylc, 109 lTtah 213, 17± P. 2d l±S, defendand had the right to i1nprove its ditch in the interest
of w;ater conservation and as long as it carries out this
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right to improve in a reasonable manner, plaintiffs have
no legal grounds for complaint though the improvements
result in decreasing the value of the servient estates.
vVe, therefore, have two questions to be determined. (1)
Did the defendant, in carrying out its rights to improve
the ditch, do this in a reasonable manner~ (2) In making
the improvements in a reasonable manner, did the defendant have the right to use more land than that used
during the p·rescriptive period~
Under the first point, Mr. Austin, Engineer for the
Soil Conservation Service, testified that the present
ditch was designed and construeted in accordance with
the standard specifications developed by Federal Agencies and adopted by the Soil Conservation Service in
Washington; that the ditch was the mo.st feasible, economical and efficient ditch for that particular territory.
There is no testimony contradicting this fact. In fact,
to attain F·ederal assistance, it was necessary to construct this type of ditch.
In regard to the second question, let us analyze
the statement made in the Big Cottonwood case, supra,
which stated as follows:
"In no case would the easement owner be
allowed in improving his ditch to take more or
different land from the servient estate than that
used during the prescriptive p·eriod."
Doe.s this mean that you cannot vviden the ditch or
that you cannot use modern equipment if, in doing so,
you would use temporarily more land .along the banks
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than you would have used during the prescriptive period
in the horse and buggy days'
Under the facts it is contended that defendant did
not use more land along the banks than during the
p-rescriptive period.
Under the authorities both of this jurisdiction and
other.s, we have come to the conclusion that it must mean
the first statement, that is, that you cannot widen your
ditch. As a corollary to defendant's easement to convey water across plaintiffs' land, defendant also has a
secondary easement over the course of the ditch for the
purpose of cleaning and maintenance. Simonson v. Moon
(Idaho), 237 P. 2d 93, 169 A.L.R. 1148, Holm v. Davis,
41 Utah 200, 125 P. 403. In the case of Laden t·s. Atkeson,
112· Montana 302, 116 P. 2d 881, the Court quotes mth
approval the following statement in Jones on Ease1nents:
"In the same test, sec. 820, p. 659, the author
recognizes the right to use adjacent soil for purposes of repair in this language: 'In repairing
a ditch or w.aterrace the o'vner of the easement
has the incidental right to use the adj·acent soil
for this purpose, in case the repairs cannot be
made in any other 'vay. The fact that the earth
so used is the p-roperty of the o'\\11er of the servient tenement does not settle the que.stion ,vhether
the owner of th~ ease1nent may take it for the
purpose of making repairs. •Tile o"Tner of the
easement is privileged to repair in all cases "There
the ·e.aseine~t cannot be enjoyed ,vithout repairs:
and In making them, he 111a-y dig up tl1e soil and
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otherwise use and encumber it, doing no more
injury than is necessary, when such course is indispensable to the enjoyment of the easement.' "
The Laden case is cited with ap·proval in Salt Lake
City v. J. B. and R. E. Walker, ____ Utah ____ , 253 P. 2d
365. From these authorities the question seems to be
not whether defendant used more land along the banks
than had previously been use-d in making the repairs,
but whether the s1ame was nece~ssary and reasonable
in making the proper repairs and improvements to the
ditch and in providing means for the proper use of the
same.
C. W. Lauritzen, who is connected with the College
at Logan and with the Agricultural Research Service
of the United States, testified that he had examined the
land of the plaintiffs after the ditch had been cemented.
In his opinion it was neces.sary to take out the scrub
oak and use the land .along the banks in order to make
the improvements. He stated that he did not see how the
land had been damaged or that it had been unnecessarily
disturbed. Such work was necessary to bring in equipment for making the iinprovements.
A11:stin, the Engineer in charge, testified that in
order to concrete the ditch, the use of the land on the
west was necessary in order to bring in the cement
trucks and equipment and the use of th·e bank on the east
was necessary in order to hold the slip form. There was
also testimony that it was ne·cessary to scrape down the
old high banks on the west in order to fill the ditch so
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that the same might be straightened and put in condition
to be cemented. No one testified that more land was used
than was necessary in order to cement the ditch with
modern equipment.
The Court by giving its instruction.s No. 5 and 6,_
see page 15-16 of appendix, in one statement gave to the
defendant the right to make the improvements, but in
another statement endeavored to limit the amount of land
to that used during the prescriptive period. We are of
th·e opinion under the authorities cited that the true and
correct statement of the law was set forth in defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 5 (See appendix page 19)
which the Court refu.sed to give.
II. 'THE QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

Th·e Court should not have submitted to the jury
the question of exemplary dan1ages. (Instruction X o. 10,
appendix page 17). There is no testimony that the defendant knew that its act in n1aking the improvements
was wrongful .and that "~thout just c.ause it intentionally
did the work. The defendant acted in good faith and
in honest belief that it "\Yas la,vful to 1nake the improvements as it did. Our Supren1e Court in nun1erous decisions has held that to justify a recovery of exen1plary
damages, the act causing the injury n1ust be done "\Yith
,an evil intent and ,,,.ith the purpose of injuring the plaintiffs or with surh a \\'"anton and rPckless disregard of their
rights as evidences a "\YrongfulinotiYe. Rugg v. Tobnau,
39 Utah 295, 117 1-:>. 54, Calhoun Y. [;-niversal Cred£t Cont-
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pany, 106 Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 284, Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1
Utah 362, 267 P. 2d 759.
Under the Court's instructions and the authorities
the defendant had the right to go upon plaintiffs' land
to make the improvements to its ditch. It advised plaintiffs that it was going to do so and Mr. Harvey did not
object to the same except as to the type of the ditch.
Mr. Harvey told them to go ahead and make it if they
wanted to but they would have to cover it. The Supreme Court in the case of Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200,
125 P. 403, stated :
"In view of the foregoing, what were the
rights of appellant with respect to entering upon
the lands of respondent to repair and clean out
the ditch or canal in question~ The right of the
owner of an easement is admirably stated by Mr.
Jones in his excellent work on Easements, sec. 814,
in the following words: ''The owner of a dominant
estate having an easement has a right to enter
upon the servient estate, and make repairs necessary for the reasonable and convenient use of the
easement, doing no unnecessary injury to the
servient estate.' A large number of cases in support of the doctrine are collated by th·e author in
a footnote to the section aforesaid to which we
refer the reader. The doctrine is also well illustrated and applied to an irrigating ditch by the
Supreme Court of California in Joseph v. Ager,
108 Cal. 517, 41 Pac. 422. The finding in the case
at b.ar 'that in performing the work necessary
thereto no unecessary damage or injury was done
to the ground of the plaintiff' while not as specific
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as could be desired, yet must be construed to mean
just what appellant by its servants and employes
had a right to do, namely, to enter upon respondent's land along the canal or ditch in question for
the purpose of repairing and cleaning out the
same, and, if in doing the work no unnecessary
injury was done to respondent's land, appellant
cannot be charged as a trespasser."
III.
JURY.

'THE

COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE

We have already discussed the error committed by
the Court in giving Instruction Nos. 5, 6 and 10 and the
refusal to give

defendant'~

Requested Instruction No. 5.

The Court also committed error in giving Instruction
No. 12 (Appendix, page 18). The defendant objected
to the giving of the instruction and made a further objection to the first paragraph which is as follows:
"You are instructed that the irrigation company has the right, under the eminent domain
Laws of the State of Utah, to condemn a right of
w.ay over the lands of the plaintiffs, and that by
paying damages therefor the defendant could acquire the right to cross the lands of the plaintiffs
with such types of structures as defendant may
·elect to use." (R. 212).
This instruction 'Yent out of the pleadings and issues
of this ca.se. It was prejudicial to defendant in that it
stressed the fact that defendant should have taken sou1e
other method of acquiring a right-of-"~ay "Thich it claims
it alre:ady had.·
Instructions should be confined to the issues preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sented by the pleadings and the evidence. It is improper
to give an in.struction announcing a naked legal proposition, however correct it may be, unless it bears upon
and is connected with the isRues involved. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P. 74.
In 53 Am. Jur., Sec. 574, page 453, it is stated:

"* * * No instruction should be given by the
court either on its own motion or at the request of
counsel which tenders an issue that is not presented by the pleadings or supported by the evidence, or which deviates therefrom in any material respect. Requested instructions, even
though correctly stating the law, which ignore an
essential phase of a case that is supported by evidence, or are without basis in the evidence, or are
not applicable to the situation disclosed by the
evidence, should and will be refused. To give such
an instruction would tend to mislead the jury into
the belief that such issue is before them, and may
cause them to bring in an improper verdict. Accordingly, requests to charge are properly refused
where they are directed or refer to matters wholly
outside the issues as presented by the pleadings
and made by the evidence, where they relate to a
contention, theory, or ground of liability not p~re
sented by the pleadings, or where they relate at
mo.st to a single consideration or subsidiary fact
bearing upon an issue. * * * ."

Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87,
283 P. 160 (Aug. 1929).
"Appellants complain of the first sentence
above upon the ground that it has no application
to the facts in this case, that this accident did not
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happen at a crossing or street intersection, and
therefore the instruction is misleading and erroneous, and rely on the following cases: Wright v.
Intermountain Motor Car c·o., 53 Utah 176, 177
P. 237; Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P.
74; Riding v. Roylance, 63 Utah 221, 224 P. 885;
Koutsis v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 63
Utah 254, 225 P. 339. These cases ·establish the
proposition that an instruction which relates to
matters outside the issues, or as to which there is
no substantial evidence, is improper.''
The failure of the Court to give defendant's Instruction No. 1 (Appendix 19) was ·erroneous in that the evidence .shows that the defendant made its improvements
in a reasonable and pTudent manner and without any
unnecessary injury to the plaintiffs and the case should
not have been submitted to the jury.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment based
upon the verdict of the jury should be reversed and in
any ·event, a new trial should be granted in the matter.
GUSTIN, RICHARDS
MA·TTSSON & E\TANS

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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APPENDIX
Respectfully submitted,
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 (R. 206-207) (Exception R. 221222)
"You are instructed that the evidence shows and the
plaintiffs admit that the defendant irrigation company
i.s the owner of an easement to maintain a dirt canal
across the lands of the plaintiffs to transport w.ater.
This easement came into existence by more than 20 years
of use, as distinguished from an express grant. When
an easement come.s into existence by usage, as this one
did, you are instructed that th.e easement is limited to
the extent of the use historic.ally made and the defendant
generally has no right to enlarge or extend the burden
on plaintiffs' lands.
You are instructed, however, that the law does grant
to the owner of an easement for a canal the right to improve the canal for the purpose of preventing waste of
water, but the improvement of the dirt canal so as to
prevent wa.ste of water may only be made so long as the
new developments are reasonably made to conserve
water and do not unnecessarily burden the lands of the
plaintiffs, and in making the improvements the defendant
had no right to rtake or use more land of the plaintiffs.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant in replacing the existing dirt canal
with a cement canal went beyond what was reasonably
necessary to conserve and prevent the waste of water,
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which defendant has historically take·n across the plaintiffs' lands, and that it unreasonably and unnecessarily
increased the burden on the lands of the plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs are enrtitled to recover from the defendant such
an amount of money as you find from a preponderance
of the evidence will fairly and reasonably compensate
plaintiffs for the damage done, if any, by reason of extra
burden on and damage to the plaintiffs' lands. If, on the
other hand, you find that the cement canal as constructed
was reasonably necessary for the water defendant has
hi.storically taken across the plaintiffs' lands, or to take
more lands, and to prevent the waste of that water, and
that the type of construction did not unreasonably or unnecessarily burden plaintiffs' land, then you are instructed that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages for the change from a dirt to a cement canal."

INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (R. 208-209) (Exception R. 221222)
"You are instructed that the right of the defendant
canal company to waterp-roof its canal for the purpose
of preventing waste of "Tater does not extend to nor permit the defendant to cut trees ru1d slrrubbery an·ywhere
except in the eanal itself, or i1nn1ediate ly along its banks,
and to the extent that the canal .and its banks have been
historically occupied and used by the defendant in the
maintenance of its canal. You are also instructed that
defendant may not, in the 1naintenance of its e<lnal, leave
debri.s and waste 1naterial piled on plaintiffs' land, except as defendant 1nay have historically eut trees and
left debris on plaintiff's land.
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If you find from .a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant cut trees and shrubbery from the
plaintiffs' lands without plaintiffs' permission beyond
the canal and its banks previously oecupied and used by
the defendant in the maintenance of its canal, and more
than was reasonably necessary to the waterp·roofing of
its ditch, or that defendant cut trees and shrubs and
left them or other debris on plaintiffs' land, then you are
instructed that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages therefore, and you should proceed to
assess the damage and to award to the plaintiffs such
sum of money as will reasonably compensate plaintiffs
for the damage thus done, if any you shall find, but in no
event can compensatory damages be awarded in excess
of $10,000.00.
If, on the other hand, you shall find that the defendant cut only trees and shrubbery through the are.a which
it has historically occupied with its canal and in the maintenance thereof, and only to the extent rea.sonably necessary to waterproof its canal, and that it left no debris
or trees stacked on plaintiffs' land, then you are instructed that the defendant is not liable for any damages
to the plaintiffs from cutting s.aid trees or from leaving
debris, and you shall find this issue in favor of the defendant."
INS·TRUCTION NO. 10 (R. 211-212) (Exception R. 222)
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they shall find
for the plaintiffs and that the defendant or its agents
or servants committed a wrongful act or wrongful acts
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upon the plaintiffs' land, or to the plaintiffs' property,
and shall further find from a preponderance of the evidence that said wrongful act or .acts were willfully and
intentionally done by defendant, in conscious disregard
of the plaintiffs' right, then you may award the plaintiffs
in addition to compensatory damages such additional
sum, but not exceeding $5,000.00, as you may deem proper,
by way of punishment to the defendant, and to deter the
defendant and other persons from the commission of
similar wrongs in the future, by the example thereby
afforded."
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 (R& 211-212) (Exception R. 222)
"You are instructed that the irrigation company has
the right, under the eminent domain la-\YS of the State
of Utah, to condemn a right of "~ay over the lands of the
plaintiffs, and that by paying damages therefor the
defendant could acquire the right to cross the lands of
the plaintiffs "'"ith such types of structures a$ defendant
may elect to use.
However, you are instructed that not"'ithstanding
the right of eminent do1nain, as stated above, the defendant did have the right to go upon the plaintiffs' land
for the purpose of Inaintaining~ rleaning, repairing,
waterproofing, and to prev-ent seepage, so long as the
defendant did not unrea.sonably and unneces&arily increase the burden to the plaintiffs' land in the exercise of
the right the defendant had by reason of its ea.se1nent,
as elsewhere in the preeeeding instructions explained."
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (R. 26) (Exception R. 220)
"You are instructed that your verdict shall be in
favor of the defendant .and against the plaintiffs, no
cause of action."
INSTRU~c·TION

NO. 5 (R. 29) (Exception R. 220-221)

"You are instructed that the defendant has a right
of way and easement over the land of plaintiffs where it
maintains its irrigation ditch, and by re.ason thereof it
has the right to go upon plaintiffs' land to operate, repair, maintain and improve its ditch. You are further
instructed that the defendant in connection with the
operation, repair, maintenance and the making of improvements to its ditch has the right to so much of the
land on each side of the ditch as may be reasonably necessary for the purpose of maintaining, repairing, improving and the enjoyment of its easement, and if you find
from the evidence that that is all defendant has done,
then even though there was some damage by reason
thereof, your verdict shall be in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiffs, no cau.se of action."
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